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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
JESUS PARTIDA, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20070356-CA 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-103(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in sentencing Partida to consecutive prison 
sentences? "A sentence will not be overturned on appeal unless the trial court has abused 
its discretion, failed to consider all legally relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that 
exceeds legally prescribed limits." State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 456 (Utah App. 1993). 
Specifically, the trial court's decision to impose consecutive sentences is reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion. State v. Fedorwicz, 2002 UT 67, \ 63, 52 P.3d 1194. This issue was 
preserved in arguments made at sentencing (R. 397: 2-4). 
i 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All relevant statutory provisions are set forth in the Addenda of the Appellant's 
Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The Defendant, Jesus Partida, appeals from the judgment, sentence and 
commitment of the Honorable Steven L. Hansen, Fourth District Court, after he was 
convicted by a jury of multiple felony sex offenses. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Jesus Partida was charged by criminal information filed on August 22, 2005 with 
four counts of forcible sodomy, first degree felonies, and eleven counts of forcible sexual 
abuse, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated §§ 76-5-403(2) and 
76-5-404, respectively (R. 04-01). Partida waived his right to a preliminary hearing (R. 
60-58). 
Partida filed a Motion to Exclude Confession on September 12, 2006 on the 
grounds that neither Partida's statements after his alleged confession, nor statements by 
other people, corroborate his confession (R. 119-10). On October 5, 2006 an evidentiary 
suppression hearing was held before Judge Hansen (R. 395). On October 10, 2006 Judge 
Hansen denied Pallida's motion pursuant to the factors set forth in State v. Mauchley, 
2003 UT 10, 67 P.3d 477 (R. 182-74). 
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The trial court found the confession given by Partida to be trustworthy by a 
preponderance of the evidence and based on the totality of the circumstances (R. 179, 
177). The court found further: One, that there was no deception or trickery in forcing the 
testimony from Partida, and that Partida voluntarily initiated the interview with police (R. 
177). Two, that Partida was given his Miranda warnings and confessed of his own free 
will (R. 177). Three, that Partida is in good physical and mental condition, that he speaks 
English fluently and showed no signs of understanding Detective Eccles (R. 177). In 
addition, he is mature, had some college education, and was praised during his employee 
evaluations (R. 177). Four, Detective Eccles confirmed that all of the alleged victims 
resided at the care center during Pallida's employment there, and that he was often 
responsible for their care (R. 176). Five, that during his interviews, Partida was 
consistent with his story and only deviated on a few minor details from interview to 
interview (R. 176). 
A jury trial was held on October 11-12, 2006 (R. 195-91). Partida was convicted 
of all fifteen counts (R. 195-91). 
On January 16, 2007 Partida was sentenced to five-years to life sentences on 
counts 1-4, and to 1-15 year sentences on counts 5-15. The court ordered that counts 1-
10 should be consecutive sentences, and counts 11-15 could be served concurrently (R. 
346-43). 
After trial, Partida filed first a motion to arrest then a motion for new trial, arguing 
that insufficient independent evidence corroborating Pallida's confession was presented 
by the State, and that the court should re-examine the motion to exclude confession (R. 
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303-288, 359-50). The trial court denied the motions (R. 340-338, 369-67). The motion 
for new trial was denied on March 14, 2007 (R. 369-67). 
On April 13, 2007 Partida filed a notice of appeal in Fourth District Court (R. 
382). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
A. Testimony of BJ Eccles 
BJ Eccles of the American Fork Police Department testified that he became 
involved in this matter when he was told by Officer Doyle that Jesus Partida would be 
coming in to the police department to disclose some information that had been disclosed 
to a counselor or doctor (R. 394: 35, 36). 
At approximately 9:00 a.m. on July 14, 2005 Partida came into the police 
department with his wife, and his LDS bishop (R. 394: 36). Eccles spoke briefly with the 
three of them before taking Partida into an interview room (R. 394: 36-37). He left 
Partida alone in the interview room briefly while he put a blank videotape in a machine to 
record the interview (R. 394: 37). Before the interview began, Eccles read Partida his 
Miranda rights and had him sign a waiver form (State's Exhibit #1) (R. 394: 39-40). 
During the interview, Partida disclosed that he had abused different women while 
working at the Heritage Care Center in American Fork from 2003-2005 (R. 394: 44). 
State's Exhibit #3 is the videotape from the interview on July 14, 2005. A transcript of 
that interview was prepared (R. 404). 
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First, he admitted to placing his finger inside the vagina of Alta Bench on two 
separate occasions; and that on another occasion he attempted to have her perform oral 
sex on him by taking his pants down and placing his penis on her mouth (R. 394: 44). 
Second, Partida said that on two occasions he also touched the vagina of Margaret 
Timmons (R. 394: 45). He worked as a CNA and this occurred while he was changing 
her diaper (R. 394: 45). 
Third, Partida admitted to sticking his fingers inside the vagina of Mabel Williams 
while also changing her diaper (R. 394: 45-46). He also disclosed that on another 
occasion he played with her clitoris while she was leaning up against the wall (R. 394: 
46). 
Four, Partida indicated that on one occasion he stuck his finger in Dorothy Veth's 
vagina (R. 394: 46-47). The transcript of the videotape quotes Partida as saying 
"Dorothy, I just did it once with her.... I tried to... in the process of cleaning, I stick my 
finger in her vagina just once" (R. 404: 2). 
Five, Partida told Eccles that he also placed his finger inside the vagina of Ruth 
Miranda (R. 394: 47). Partida's exact words were that in the process of cleaning, he 
"stick my finger in her vagina. But it wasn't like—you know—like bad or like—well, it 
was bad. But it wasn't like to have sex" (R. 404: 2). Partida was asked by Eccles why he 
did it and he replied, "Just out of—you know—sometimes you see just how their 
reaction—or like a couple of times to try and stimulate" (R. 404: 2). 
Six, while caring for Mary Crawford, Partida pulled his pants down and placed his 
penis on her hand and had her hold it (R. 394: 47). Partida stated, "I didn't try to have 
sex with them... [with] Crawford, I like guide her hand... since she always like—you 
know—she had this thing she liked to grab, so I guide her hand to my—my penis" (R. 
404: 2-3). He stated "There wasn't masturbation or any movement or any jiggling, 
nothing" (R. 404: 3). 
Seven, Partida admitted that on one occasion while caring for Lois Dalzen, he 
touched her vagina (R. 394: 47-48, 404: 4). In addition, he fondled her breasts on two 
occasions and attempted to have oral sex by placing his penis on her mouth (R. 394: 48, 
404: 4-5). Partida stated, "I touch her... nipple and breast. Kind of like—it was in the 
process of getting her ready, so I didn't do it for like—I didn't stay there" (R. 404: 3). He 
did it "[t]o see how she react," and he admitted to getting "some urge" from it (R. 404: 3-
4). 
Eight, Partida identified Mary (Vestel) who was a resident of the south hall (R. 
394: 48). He attempted to have her perform oral sex on him (R. 394: 48). "He undid his 
pants, placed his penis in her mouth, in Mary's. During this time, Mr. Partida told me 
that Mary must have thought that she was eating food and bit down on his penis, causing 
it to bleed. Mr. Partida further explained to me that he then masturbated and ejaculated 
on her mouth" (R. 394: 49; 404: 5). 
Nine, Partida disclosed to Eccles that on another occasion "he pulled down his 
pants, placed his penis on Lisa (Garrett's) mouth in an attempt to have her perform oral 
sex on him. He told me that she was very out of it and she didn't know what was going 
on. And there was no further action, or no other incident occurred after that, with— 
pertaining to oral sex" (R. 394: 50). Eccles testified that Partida also indicated that, "he 
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really liked Lisa... [a]nd he would kiss her various times" (R. 394: 50). Partida also 
described touching her vagina on one occasion and to having her hold his penis until he 
could masturbate and ejaculate" (R. 394: 50). See also, R. 404: 7-8, 10. He ejaculated on 
her nightgown (R. 404: 9). 
Ten, Partida also admitted to pulling his pants down and placing his penis very 
quickly into the mouth of Linda Howard (R. 394: 51; 404: 10-11). He didn't ejaculate 
because he felt guilty (R. 404: 11). 
Partida told Eccles that these patients "were very out of it, they had either 
Alzheimer's or dementia of some sort or another, or long term cancer that they couldn't 
just concentrate on him" (R. 394: 51). None of them were unaware of what was going on 
(R. 394: 51). Eccles testified that Partida indicated he did these acts "for sexual 
gratification," and because he was curious to see what their facial reactions would be (R. 
394:51-52). 
Eccles also had Partida fill out a witness statement (State's Exhibit #2) (R. 394: 
52-54). On the form is written out the Miranda warnings, as well as an admonition that 
it's a class B misdemeanor to provide a false statement to police (R. 394: 55). Eccles 
then went into the videotape room and discovered that the machine was not recording (R. 
394: 55-56). He grabbed another tape and plugged it into the machine and then repeated 
the initial interview with Partida (R. 394: 56). 
Eccles denied threatening or intimidating Partida during the interview (R. 394: 
57). At the end of the interview, Eccles told Partida that if he wasn't told everything then 
"we are going to be a lot meaner too" (R. 404: 12). 
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After the interview, Partida went home with his wife (R. 394: 61). 
Eccles also interviewed Partida on August 2, 2005 (R. 394: 62). Partida was 
dropped off at the police department by his wife (R. 394: 63). Eccles again gave Partida 
the Miranda warnings and he again signed a written waiver (State's Exhibit #5) (R. 394: 
63-64). 
Eccles drove Partida to the Heritage Care Center (R. 394: 65). Inside the center 
they went from "room to room and had him explain what occurred in those rooms" (R. 
394: 66). This interview was also videotaped (R. 394: 66). State's Exhibit #4, which 
has also been transcribed (R. 405), is the recording of that interview.1 
The reason for the second interview was so Eccles could corroborate what he was 
told during the first interview "and to make sure that these people were there, and where 
these acts allegedly occurred" (R. 394: 69). In addition, Eccles tried to get as much 
information about the rooms to corroborate Partida's statements because some of the 
women had died (R. 394: 69). He was not able to interview any of the women because 
eight of the ten were deceased by the time of the investigation, and the other two could 
not be interviewed because of their mental conditions (R. 394: 70-71). 
The tape of the interview begins in the middle of discussion while in Lois 
Dawson's (Dalzen) room (R. 405: 16). Partida stated she was tall and big, and that he 
tried to have oral sex with her while she was sitting down (R. 405: 17, 18). He also stated 
1
 It appears that the first part of the transcript of this interview also contains the July 14, 
2005 interview. The new material begins at the very bottom of page 16. 
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that he touched her breast another occasion, and touched her vagina while cleaning "to 
see how she react" (R. 405: 18-19). 
In Altha Bench's room (room 302), Partida stated he stuck his finger up to the first 
knuckle into her vagina after her shower while he was putting a new brief on her and 
cleaning her (R. 405: 20). He was wearing gloves (R. 405: 21). He stated that when she 
had the room, the bed was in a different location (R. 405: 22). On another occasion he 
tried to have oral sex with her while she was sitting on the toilet (R. 405: 23). He pulled 
down his scrubs and pulled his penis out of his underwear, and then tried to stick his 
penis in her mouth but "couldn't reach" (R. 405: 24). He stated he "didn't touch her with 
my penis" (R. 405:24). 
In Margaret Timmons' room, everything was arranged the same way (R. 405: 25-
26). While he was cleaning her one morning, he stuck his finger in her vagina while she 
was laying in bed (R. 405: 26-27). He never tried to perform oral sex on her (R. 405: 28). 
In Bena Howard's room, the furniture had been rearranged because it was no 
longer her room (R. 405: 29). Partida stated that she was "abused once" (R. 405: 30). He 
pulled his scrubs down and touched her mouth with his penis (R. 405: 30-31). 
In Mabel Williams' room, Partida indicated that on one occasion he was cleaning 
her after a bowel movement and stuck his finger in her vagina up to the first knuckle (R. 
405: 33-34). It happened once (R. 405: 34). 
In "Mary's" room, Partida recalled that she lived in the room approximately 
December of 2003 (R. 405: 35). She was in a wheelchair and the door open, and a 
curtain was half closed (R. 405: 36-37). He tried to perform oral sex on her—he touched 
her lips with his penis (R. 405: 37-38). It happened once (R. 405: 38). 
In Lisa Garrett's room, Partida recalled she was in bed and he tried to perform oral 
sex on her (R. 405: 40, 41-43). The door was open, and the curtain was pulled over (R. 
405: 40). It happened on two separate occasions (R. 405: 41). He ejaculated pulling out 
(R. 405: 43-45). 
In Dorothy Veth's room, Partida testified that at the time the bed was different but 
in the same location (R. 405: 46). He stated that as he was wiping and cleaning her with 
his gloves on, he stuck his fmger in her vagina (R. 405: 46). She asked what he was 
doing, and he replied that he was "just cleaning" (R. 405: 47). It happened one time (R. 
405: 47). The curtain was pulled but the door was open (R. 405: 47). 
In Ruth Miranda's room, Partida disclosed that he tried to get her to hold his penis 
(R. 405: 49-50). 
Afterwards, Eccles and Partida returned to the police station and watched the 
videotape from the care center (R. 405: 71). Eccles testified that Partida indicated that 
the statements he made at the care center were accurate (R. 405: 71). 
Eccles testified that he became aware the previous week, during an evidentiary 
hearing, that Partida had recanted his confessions (R. 405: 72). 
B. Testimony of Steven Fraser 
Steven Fraser testified that he is the administrator at the Heritage Care Center (R. 
394: 120). He testified that Partida began working at the center as a CNA the end of 
June, 2003 (R. 394: 121, 122), and he ceased his employment there to take another job in 
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February-March of 2005 (R. 394: 123). Fraser testified that Partida was "well mannered, 
clean cut, professional, I would have characterized him as a good CNA" (R. 394: 124). 
The defense stipulated that the resident history lists and face sheets, which were 
introduced into evidence "indicate the same room numbers that we saw on [the] videos, 
that these residents were in those rooms at that time" (R. 394: 126). The parties also 
stipulated that each of the women suffered from some degree of Alzheimer's or dementia 
or some other type of mentally debilitating disorder (R. 394: 138). 
Fraser testified that it was very common for a CNA to be alone with a 
patient/resident (R. 394: 137). A CNA's job includes cleaning and changing diapers (R. 
394: 138-39). It would not be inappropriate for a CNA to touch the private parts of a 
resident for cleaning purposes (R. 394: 139). But touching with a different intent would 
be very inappropriate (R. 394: 139). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Partida to consecutive prison 
terms given all the mitigating factors that were present and argued to the court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In Sentencing Partida to 
Consecutive Prison Terms. 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-201(2) provides: "Within the limits prescribed by 
this chapter, a court may sentence a person convicted of an offense to any one of the 
following sentences or combination of them: (a) to pay a fine; (b) to removal or 
disqualification from public or private office; (c) to probation unless otherwise 
specifically provided by law; (d) to imprisonment...." This Court will not reverse a 
sentencing decision of a trial court unless it constitutes an abuse of discretion, the trial 
court failed to consider all legally relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that exceeds 
legally prescribed limits." State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 456 (Utah App. 1993). 
Partida asserts that the trial court erred in sentencing him to consecutive prison 
terms on counts 1-10. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2) provides that the determination of 
concurrent or consecutive sentences shall take into account "the gravity and 
circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and 
rehabilitative needs of the defendant" (emphasis added). The language of the statute is 
mandatory; all factors listed must be taken into account by the trial court in determining 
the sentence. Concurrent sentences are favored over consecutive ones. State v. Galli, 
967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998); State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 1301 (Utah 1993). See 
also State v. Thurston, 781 P.2d 1296, 1300 (Utah App. 1989) ("The entire sentencing 
process is a search for truth and an evaluation of alternatives"). 
Partida asserts that under the facts of this case, the trial court abused its discretion 
in sentencing him to consecutive prison terms on counts 1-10. While there is no statutory 
obligation in this case that the trial court weigh the mitigating and the aggravating factors 
in imposing sentence, Partida asserts that an examination of these factors is relevant to a 
consideration of the factors required by statute in the imposition of consecutive 
sentences, as well as looking at the ends of justice and public interest. 
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In this case the factors in aggravation are: One, the victims were vulnerable. 
Two, there were multiple victims. Three, Partida's attitude is not conducive to probation. 
Four, that these were sex offenses and he qualifies as a high risk offender. Five, that 
Partida was in a position of authority (PSI at Form 4). On the other hand, the only 
mitigating factor listed was that Partida had extended periods of arrest-free street time 
(id.). 
Partida not only has extended periods of arrest-free time, these offenses are his 
only criminal convictions (PSI at 6). He scored 1 point on the Sex Offender Criminal 
History Assessment (PSI at Form 2). Moreover, at the time of sentencing he had served 
522 days (PSI at Form 4). Furthermore, he has no history of gang involvement or 
substance abuse issues (PSI at 2, 6). 
In addition, Partida asserts that there are several mitigating facts in this matter 
which were not included: One, that he assisted law enforcement in the resolution of these 
crimes. He was the one who voluntarily came forward. His confessions were the only 
evidence of any wrong doing here. 
Two, Partida is educated and has exceptionally good employment. At trial, the 
administrator of the care center testified that he had been a very good employee. In 
addition, he has worked as a car salesman and spent over three years total working for 
C.R. Cabinets in Lindon (PSI at 3). 
Three, all offenses were basically from a single criminal episode (PSI at Form 2, 
4). 
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Partida asserts that all of these mitigating circumstances argue in favor of non-
consecutive sentences. The psychological evaluation recommended that he represents a 
high risk to sexually offend in the future, and that he should not be released into the 
community until he has made "remarkable gains in a sex offender treatment program" 
(Evaluation attached to PSI at 7). Partida did not argue against prison at sentencing. 
Instead, he asserts that the trial court's only abuse of discretion was in ordering that 
counts 1-10 should be served consecutively. Concurrent sentences are favored over 
consecutive ones; and Partida asserts that this should particularly be the case here, where 
the only evidence of any wrongdoing came from his own confessions. There was no 
other independent evidence. Accordingly, he maintains that the trial court abused its 
discretion in sentencing him to consecutive prison terms. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Partida asks that this Court vacate his sentence and remand to the trial court for a 
new sentencing. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of March, 2009. 
Margaret r. Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
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General, 160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, 
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Westlaw 
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-3-201 Page 1 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code 
*B Chapter 3. Punishments 
*ffl Part 2. Sentencing 
-• § 76-3-201. Definitions—Sentences or combination of sentences allowed—Civil penalties—Hearing 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any other criminal conduct for 
which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of committing the 
criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general damages, which a person could recover 
against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activi-
ties and includes the money equivalent of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses in-
cluding earnings and medical expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a victim, and payment for ex-
penses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation and as further defined in Title 77, Chapter 38a, 
Crime Victims Restitution Act. 
(e)(i) "Victim" means any person who the court determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the de-
fendant's criminal activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's criminal activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a person convicted of an offense to any one of 
the following sentences or combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West Nn riaim t* n ™ TTC n—. 
(e) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
(f) to death. 
(3)(a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; 
(iii) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil penalty. 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(4)(a) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any 
other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to the victims, or for conduct 
for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement. 
(b) In determining whether restitution is appropnate, the court shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided 
in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act. 
(5)(a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court shall order the defendant to pay restitution of 
governmental transportation expenses if the defendant was: 
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another within the state at governmental expense to 
resolve pending criminal charges; 
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and 
(iii) convicted of a crime. 
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if any of the 
following apply: 
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent failure to appear a warrant is issued for an in-
fraction; or 
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order. 
(c)(i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection (5)(a)(i) shall be calculated according 
to the following schedule: 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
U C A 1953 §76-3-201 Page 3 
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported, 
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported, and 
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported 
(n) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to each defendant transported regardless of the 
number of defendants actually transported m a single trip 
(d) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve pending 
criminal charges and is convicted of criminal activity m the county to which he has been returned, the court may, 
in addition to any other sentence it may impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended by 
any governmental entity for the extradition 
(6)(a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, and unless otherwise ordered by the court pursuant to 
Subsection (6)(c), the defendant shall pay restitution to the county for the cost of mcarceration in the county correc-
tional facility before and after sentencmg if 
(I) the defendant is convicted of criminal activity that results in incarceration in the county correctional facility, 
and 
(n)(A) the defendant is not a state prisoner housed m a county correctional facility through a contract with the 
Department of Corrections, or 
(B) the reimbursement does not duplicate the reimbursement provided under Section 64-13e-104 if the defen-
dant is a state probationary inmate, as defmed m Section 64-13e-102, or a state parole inmate, as defmed in 
Section 64-13e-102 
(b)(i) The costs of mcarceration under Subsection (6)(a) are the amount determined by the county correctional fa-
cility, but may not exceed the daily inmate mcarceration costs and medical and transportation costs for the county 
correctional facility 
(n) The costs of mcarceration under Subsection (6)(a) do not include expenses incurred by the county correc-
tional facility m providing reasonable accommodation for an inmate qualifying as an individual with a disability 
as defmed and covered by the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U S C 12101 through 12213, 
including medical and mental health treatment for the inmate's disability 
(c) In determining whether to order that the restitution required under this Subsection (6) be reduced or that the 
defendant be exempted from the restitution, the court shall consider the criteria under Subsections 77-38a-302 
(5)(c)(i) through (IV) and shall enter the reason for its order on the record 
(d) If on appeal the defendant is found not guilty of the criminal activity under Subsection (6)(a)(i) and that find-
ing is fmal as defmed m Section 76-1-304, the county shall reimburse the defendant for restitution the defendant 
paid for costs of mcarceration under Subsection (6)(a) 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West No Claim to Oris US Gov WnrW 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-3-201; Laws 1979, c. 69, § 1; Laws 1981, c. 59, § 1; Laws 1983, c. 85, § 1; Laws 1983, c. 
88, §3 ; Laws 1984, c. 18, § l;Laws 1986, c. 156, § l;Laws 1987, c. 107, § LLaws 1990. c. 81, § 1: Laws 1992. 
c. 142. § 1; Laws 1993. c. 17. § 1; Laws 1994. c. 13. § 19; Laws 1995. c. 111. S 1. eff. Mav 1. 1995; Laws 
1995.C. 117. § l.eff. Mav 1. 1995; Laws 1995. c. 301. § 1. eff. Mav 1. 1995; Laws 1995. c. 337. g l.eff. May 1. 
1995; Laws 1995. 1st Sp.Sess.. c. 10. § 1. eff. Apnl 29. 1996; Laws 1996. c. 40. § 1. eff. April 29. 1996; Laws 
1996. c. 79. g 98. eff. Apnl 29. 1996; Laws 1996. c. 241. §§ 2. 3. eff. Apnl 29. 1996; Laws 1998. c. 149. § l.eff. 
Mav 4. 1998; Laws 1999. c. 270. § 15. eff. Mav 3. 1999; Laws 2001. c. 209. § 1. eff. Apnl 30. 2001: Laws 2002. 
c. 35. § 4. eff. Mav 6. 2002: Laws 2003. c. 280. $ 1. eff. Mav 5. 2003: Laws 2006. c. 208. § 1. eff. Mav 1. 2006: 
Laws 2007. c. 154. $ 1. eff. Apnl 30. 2007: Laws 2007. c. 339. $ 3. eff. Apnl 30. 2007; Laws 2007. c. 353. § 9. 
eff. Apnl 30. 2007; Laws 2008. c. 151. § 1. eff. Mav 5. 2008. 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Westlaw 
U C A 1953 §76-3-401 Page 1 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 76 Utah Criminal Code 
*M Chapter 3 Punishments 
*li Part 4 Limitations and Special Provisions on Sentences 
•4" § 76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences—Limitations—Definition 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one felony offense, whether to 
impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses The court shall state on the record and shall mdicate in 
the order of judgment and commitment 
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to each other, and 
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutively with any other sentences the defen-
dant is already serving 
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or consecutively, the court shall consider the grav-
ity and circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of 
the defendant 
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if the later offense is committed while 
the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, unless the court fmds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing 
would be mappropnate 
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences are to run consecutively or concur-
rently, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall request clarification from the court Upon receipt of the request, the 
court shall enter a clarified order of commitment statmg whether the sentences are to run consecutively or concur-
rently 
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a smgle criminal episode as defmed in 
Section 76-1-401 
(6)(a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all sentences imposed may not exceed 30 
years imprisonment, except as provided under Subsection (6)(b) 
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if 
(1) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death penalty or a maximum sentence of life 
imprisonment, or 
(n) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct which occurs after his initial sentence 
or sentences are imposed 
(7) The limitation m Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant 
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(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which were committed prior to imposition of the 
defendant's initial sentence; or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the present sentencing court or by a court of an-
other state or federal jurisdiction, and the conduct giving rise to the present offense did not occur after his initial 
sentencing by any other court. 
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect of consecutive sentences and the manner 
in which they shall be served, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been com-
mitted for a single term that consists of the aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the maximum sentence is considered to be 30 
years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if any, constitutes the aggregate of the 
validly imposed minimum terms. 
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with the other or with a sentence pres-
ently being served, the term that provides the longer remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served. 
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of individual consecutive sentences that may 
be imposed or to affect the validity of any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually 
served under the commitments. 
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to impose consecutive sentences in misde-
meanor cases. 
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed to a secure correctional facility as de-
fined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has not been terminated or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless 
of where the person is located. 
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